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We consider a Cournot duopoly consisting of two geographically separated firms, each 
associated with a local environmental-friendly trade union that exhibits climate solidarity. In 
the basic model, firms choose abatement technologies prior to bargaining over wages and 
employment with the unions. We show that the trade unions would lower the wage with the 
degree of reciprocal solidarity, providing additional incentives for firms to adopt greener 
technology and hence improving the social welfare. In the alternative model where trade 
unions decide the wages prior to the firms’ abatement and employment decisions, the firms 
always choose the dirtiest available technology while output will increase with the degree of 
solidarity. These results suggest that establishing the social norm and practice of reciprocal 
solidarity across trade unions in appropriate manner will help the internalisation of global 
environmental issues, which could mitigate the global regulation difficulties that require 
strong cross-border coordination among governments.  
 
Keywords: green trade unions, reciprocity, climate solidarity, emissions, environmental 
technology 
 
JEL: D 43, L 13, J 50, Q 5 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Corresponding author: Elias Asproudis, Swansea University, School of Management, Department of 






The cross-border cooperation of trade unions has been long studied in the literature 
(e.g., Driffill and Van de Ploeg, 1993; Gordon and Turner, 2000). The choices and 
consequences of transnational trade union solidarity actions have been extensively discussed 
particularly in the context of multinational firms and/or labour equality issues across 
countries (e.g., Gajewska, 2009; Greer and Hauptmeier, 2008 and 2012; Fougner and 
Kurtoğlu, 2011; Dufour Poirier and Hennebert, 2015).  
The political challenges of the global coordination on climate change has been 
increasingly recognised and particularly escalated after the current US administration 
announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. At the same time, there is a growing 
discussion on the strategic engagement of trade unions in issues such as the climate change 
and environmental protection (e.g., Felli, 2014; Stevis and Felli, 2015). Some voices calling 
for climate solidarity among trade unions have been raised to deal with the social and 
environmental problems (e.g., Hampton, 2015; Brecher, 2018). Examples of labour 
organizations that characterised by climate solidarity are the Trades Union Congress (TUC)
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and the International Trade Unions Confederations. 
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Historically, trade unions collaborate with environmental groups for the protection of 
the environment and they react together against to the environmental degradation. Studies 
highlighting the trade unions’ interest for environment protection and collaboration with 
environmental groups include, among others, Truax, (1992), Gordon, (1998), Dewey, (1998), 
Obach, (1999, 2002, 2004), Bonanno, and Blome, (2001), Silverman, (2004, 2006), Mayer, 
(2009), Snell, and Fairbrother, (2010).  
This paper proposes a theoretical model to explain how the climate solidarity between 
trade unions can affect firms’ choice of anti-pollution technology, the market outcome and 
the social welfare. We introduce two geographically distinct firm-union pairs where, as an 
expression of climate solidarity between the trade unions, each union cares both about the 
environmental degradation on its own turf and the environmental damages suffered by the 
members of the other union. Therefore, the trade unions are characterised by climate 
solidarity with respect to the environmental degradation and pollution. This could be the case 
of a home and a foreign firm-union pair where each firm pollutes at a local level and each 







trade union cares for the level of the environmental damage in both countries (i.e., 
transnational climate solidarity) 
The impact of trade unions on firms’ technological choice and/or innovation has been 
explored in Dowrick and Spencer, (1994), Tauman and Weiss, (1987), Ulph and Ulph, (1988, 
1989, 1994, 1998 and 2001). However, with the exception of the study by Asproudis and Gil 
Molto (2015), the impact of trade unions on firms’ anti-pollution or environmental 
technology choice has been overlooked. This paper extends the work of Asproudis and Gil 
Molto (2015) (A&GM hereafter) who embedded the environmental concerns of the local 
trade union into the wage bargaining process with a local firm, where the firm is a competitor 
in a Cournot duopoly. More specifically, A&GM assumes that the utility of the local trade 
union is negatively affected by the emissions of the local firm. . 
Following the well-established literature, we adopt the Monopoly Union model which 
is part of the Right to Manage approach for the wage bargain process within each firm-union 
pair (see for example Oswald, 1982; Petrakis and Vlassis, 2004; Nickell and Andrews, 1983; 
Espinosa and Rhee, 1989; Booth, 1995; Lopez and Naylor, 2004 and Mukherjee, 2008). 
Moreover, each firm is solely responsible for choosing an appropriate abatement technology. 
We distinguish two different timing frames. In the basic model (BM), the firms choose 
abatement technology prior to the bargaining process with their respective union: In the first 
stage, the firms decide the abatement technology; in the second stage, trade unions decide the 
wages; in the third stage the firms decide the production level. This can be the case where the 
choice of abatement technology implies changes in the production method. For example, an 
electricity industry can choose a different mode to generate power to reduce the greenhouse 
gas emission and hence improve the workers welfare.  
We show that in the basic model the wages demanded by the trade union is decreasing 
with the degree of the reciprocal climate solidarity. This provide sufficient cost-competitive 
incentives for the local firm to adopt greener abatement technology and yields higher output 
(and hence employment) and social welfare. Moreover, the degree of reciprocal climate 
solidarity leads to greener abatement technology choice in equilibrium than the one chosen in 
the world where trade unions only care about the local pollution. These results suggest that 
establishing the social norm and practice of reciprocal climate solidarity across trade unions 
will help the internalisation of global environmental issues within the ordinary individual 
business competitions, which could mitigate some current regulation difficulties (such as 
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cross-border tax and transfers on emissions and pollutions) that require strong cross-border 
coordination among governments. 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of reciprocal climate solidarity on abatement 
technology adoption depends on the appropriate incentive design. In the alternative model 
(AM) we assume that the trade unions decide the wages prior to the firms’ decision on 
abatement technology and employment: In the first stage, the trade unions decide the wages; 
in the second and the third stage, firms decide the abatement technology and the production 
level, respectively. This can be the case where the choice of abatement technology does not 
imply changes in the production method. For example, a refinery firm adopts finer filters in 
the pipe (i.e. less substantial green technology adoption). We show that, in this case, the 
firms’ choices of abatement technology are not responsive to the wage-employment bargains.  
In other words, BM is the case where a firm can commit to an abatement level, 
whereas AM is where there is no such commitment. As a consequence, in BM, technology is 
a truly strategic variable (i.e., firms recognise it as a vehicle to influence the unions' choices 
of wages), whereas AM is equivalent to a model where technology is exogenous.  
Comparing the different timing frames, we show that, in both the BM and the AM 
wages decrease and production increases with the intensity of trade union climate solidarity. 
However, the effect of trade union climate solidarity on wages and output is stronger in the 
BM. Moreover, in the BM the abatement technology improves with the intensity of trade 
union climate solidarity while in the AM the firms will choose the dirtiest available 
technology irrespectively of the degree of trade union climate solidarity. Lower 
environmental damages and greater production in the BM compared to the AM are sufficient 
to ensure that in the BM the social welfare in greater than in the AM. From a regulatory 
perspective, environmental regulation must be stricter in industries where the firms invest in 
abatement technology after the green trade unions decide the wages. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section two, the basic and the 
alternative model are developed. In section three, the results of the two models are compared. 
Finally, section four concludes. 
 
2. The basic model 
 
Following A&GM we consider two geographically separated unionized firms 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 with 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, producing a homogeneous product that is sold in a single market. The 
inverse demand function is 𝑝 =  𝑎 – 𝑞𝑖  – 𝑞𝑗 where 𝑎 > 0 is the market size parameter, and 
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𝑞𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖  are the firms outputs. Production processes are characterized by constant returns to 
scale described by 𝑞𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖, where 𝐿𝑖 represents the number of workers employed by firm 𝑖. 
Each firm’s cost is given by 𝐶𝑖  =  𝑤𝑖 𝐿𝑖  +  𝛾(1 − 𝑘𝑖)2, where 𝑤𝑖 denotes the wage of firm 𝑖, 𝑘𝑖 ∈ (0,1]  is a technology index, and 𝛾 > 0 is a scale parameter. This cost represents 
diminishing returns to investment in abatement technology.
4
 The closer to one the value of 
technology 𝑘𝑖 is, the lower the adoption cost and the more polluting the technology will be. 
Therefore, the corresponding profits are 𝜋𝑖 = (𝑎 – 𝑞𝑖  – 𝑞𝑗)𝑞𝑖– 𝑤𝑖 𝑞𝑖 −  𝛾(1 − 𝑘𝑖)2. 
The production process generates emissions, 𝑦𝑖, according to 𝑦𝑖 =  𝑘𝑖𝑞𝑖.5 Each trade 
union cares about environmental quality at both locations. Therefore, trade union 𝑖 ’s 
perceived damage from pollution is denoted by (𝐷𝐹𝑖 + 𝑧𝐷𝐹𝑗) = (𝑒𝑦𝑖 + 𝑧𝑒𝑦𝑗) , where 𝑧 ∈ [0,1] represents the degree of climate solidarity of trade union 𝑖, and 𝑒 > 0 is a scale 
parameter.
6
 Furthermore, a trade union cares about the well-being of its members as it is 
expressed by the over-the-outside-option aggregate earnings from being employed by the 
respective firm. If 𝑤0 denotes the reservation wage these earnings are denoted by (𝑤𝑖– 𝑤0)𝐿𝑖. 
In summary, the utility of trade union 𝑖  can be expressed by 𝑈𝑖 = (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤0)𝐿𝑖 −(𝐷𝐹𝑖 + 𝑧𝐷𝐹𝑗). For simplicity, for the remainder of this paper we have set the reservation 
wage equal to zero. 
After proper substitutions and some slight modifications the trade unions utility is 
expressed by 𝑈𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖[𝑤𝑖 − (𝑒𝑘𝑖 + 𝑧𝑒𝑘𝑗)] − 𝑧𝑒(𝐿𝑗 − 𝐿𝑖)𝑘𝑗.7 The first term on the right-hand 
side shows that the trade unions utility increases with improvements in abatement 
technologies adopted by either of the two firms. The second term on the right-hand side 
expresses the competition effect showing the utility of trade union 𝑖’s is decreasing in the 
difference between outputs of firms j and 𝑖. 
Adopting the Monopoly Union model, we assume that the trade unions decide the 
wages while the firms decide the number of workers to be employed. 
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 Hence, contrary to Puller (2006), an emission reduction is not only driven by an improvement in abatement 
technology but also by a reduction in output. 
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2.1 Stage Three: Firms decide the production level 
 
In the third stage, the firms decide their production levels. Assuming Cournot-type 
competition, the profit maximizing production levels, as it has been shown in A&GM, are  ?̂?𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 = 𝑎−2𝑤𝑖+𝑤𝑗3      (1) 
Therefore, the profits are ?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖2 − 𝛾(1 − 𝑘𝑖)2. 
Substituting the optimal quantity in the trade union’s utility competition effect 
described earlier, yields 𝑧𝑒(𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗)𝑘𝑗. Thus, the relative production advantage of firm j to 
firm i is equal to the wage differential (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗). In other words, the trade unions are facing a 
trade-off between environmental protection and higher wage. 
 
2.2 Stage two: Trade unions decide the wages 
 
On stage two, the trade unions simultaneously decide the wages. After the necessary 
substitutions and calculations, the utility maximization problem for each trade union becomes  max𝑤𝑖 {𝑈𝑖 = 13 (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑒𝑘𝑖)(𝑎 − 2𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗) − 𝑒𝑘𝑗(𝑎 − 2𝑤𝑗 + 𝑤𝑖)𝑧}  (2) 
Taking the first order conditions of the maximization problem above yields the reaction 
function of each trade union that is its own wage as a function of the other union’s wage:  𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑓 = 14 (𝑎 + 2𝑒𝑘𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗 − 𝑒𝑘𝑗𝑧)    (3) 
We observe that 𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑓 𝜕𝑤𝑗⁄ > 0, implying that the wages are strategic complements. The 
intuition of the strategic complementarity between the trade unions has been explained in 
Petrakis and Vlassis (2004), if the union j sets higher wages, the level of the output of firm j 
will decrease but firm i will produce more. This induces union i to set higher wages to firm i 
when the rival firm deals with higher wages from the union j. See also, Asproudis and Gil 
Molto (2015) for a similar result. Interestingly, since 𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑓 𝜕𝑧⁄ < 0, a trade union becomes 
less aggressive in the bargaining process with the degree of its climate solidarity. Intuitively, 
for any given wage trade union 𝑗 chooses, union 𝑖 reduces its own wage to strengthen firm 𝑖’s 
competition effect. This drives firm 𝑖’s output higher and firm 𝑗’s output and, ceteris paribus, 
emissions lower. 
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𝑤𝑖 = 115 (5𝑎 + 𝑒[𝑘𝑖(8 − 𝑧) + 2𝑘𝑗(1 − 2𝑧)])   (4) 
Like in A&GM, 𝜕𝑤𝑖 𝜕𝑘𝑖⁄ > 0, implying the wage chosen by union 𝑖 decreases with 
improvements in abatement technology adopted by firm 𝑖 . Moreover, we see that 𝜕2𝑤𝑖 𝜕𝑘𝑖𝜕𝑧⁄ = − 𝑒 15⁄ < 0. Thus, the more intense the climate solidarity is, the lower the 
trade union’s incentive to penalize its respective firm for choosing dirtier technology. 
However, contrary to A&GM the wages do not always increase with the rival firm’s 
abatement technology: as 𝜕𝑤𝑖 𝜕𝑘𝑗⁄ = 𝑒(2 − 4𝑧)/15  it all depends on the level of the 
reciprocity. Hence, ∀𝑧 ∈ [0, 1/2] a wage is increasing with the rival firm’s abatement 
technology, while the opposite holds for 𝑧 ∈ [1/2, 1] . Finally, as 𝜕𝑤𝑖/𝜕𝑧 = − 115 𝑒(𝑘𝑖 +4𝑘𝑗) < 0, the wages are decreasing with the intensity of climate solidarity. 
To compare our results with the results of A&GM where z=0, we can rewrite the 
wage as  𝑤𝑖 = 115 (5𝑎 + 𝑒 [(8 − 𝑧) (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑗4 ) − 𝑘𝑗 (74 𝑧)]) 
The first part in the square brackets 𝑒(8 − 𝑧)(𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑗/4) is always consistent with the 
predictions of A&GM, (i.e., 𝜕𝑤𝑖/𝜕𝑘𝑖 > 0 and 𝜕𝑤𝑖/𝜕𝑘𝑗 > 0). The second part in the square 
brackets, −𝑘𝑗(7𝑧/4) , negatively contributes to the equilibrium wage (i.e. 𝜕𝑤𝑖/𝜕𝑘𝑗 < 0 ) 
when 𝑧 > 0. This effect increases in magnitude with 𝑧 and 𝑘𝑗 . This is consistent with the 
cost-competition effects as noted in Stage Three, which serves as sufficient incentive offered 
by trade unions to the firms for adopting better abatement technology in Stage One. 
Moreover, we can calculate the quantity competition effect by substituting the wage as 
expressed in equation (4) in equation (1). This yields the difference 𝑞𝑗 − 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑒(k𝑖 − kj)(2 +𝑧)/5. This implies that the relative production advantage of firm 𝑖 to firm 𝑗 is negatively 
linked to the improvements in abatement technology chosen in Stage One. 
 
2.3 Stage 1: Firms decide abatement technology 
 
In the first stage, the firms choose the abatement technology. After substituting (4) in 
(1) we get  ?̅?𝑖 = 145 (10𝑎 + 𝑒[𝑘𝑗(4 + 7𝑧) − 2𝑘𝑖(7 + 𝑧)])   (5) 
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Like in A&GM the production is increasing with improvements in own abatement technology 
(𝜕?̅?𝑖/𝜕𝑘𝑖 < 0) and decreasing in improvements of the rival’s abatement technology (𝜕?̅?𝑖/𝜕𝑘𝑗 > 0). 
Profit maximization is expressed as  
                                 max𝑘𝑖{?̅?𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖2 − 𝛾(1 − 𝑘𝑖)2}    (6) 
and solving simultaneously the resulting FOCs for 𝑖 = 1,2 yields optimal technologies9 and, 
through proper substitutions, optimal output and wages: 𝑘𝑖∗ = 405𝛾−4𝑎𝑒(7+𝑧)405𝛾+2𝑒2(𝑧−2)(7+𝑧)      (7) 𝑞𝑖∗ = 45𝛾[2𝑎+𝑒(𝑧−2)]405𝛾+2𝑒2(𝑧−2)(7+𝑧)      (8) 𝑤𝑖∗ = 135𝛾[2𝑎+𝑒(𝑧−2)]405𝛾+2𝑒2(𝑧−2)(7+𝑧)     (9) 
Like in A&GM our model yields 𝜕𝑘𝑖∗/𝜕𝛾 > 0 , 𝜕𝑘𝑖∗/𝜕𝑎 < 0 , 𝜕𝑞𝑖∗/𝜕𝛾 > 0  and 𝜕𝑞𝑖∗/𝜕𝑎 > 0. However, ∀𝑎 > 0, 𝑒 > 0, 𝛾 > 4𝑒2(7+𝑧)22025 , 0 ≤ 𝑧 ≤ 1 we have that 𝜕𝑘𝑖∗/𝜕𝑧 < 0. 
Hence, the firms’ abatement technology improves with the intensity of climate solidarity. In 
particular, this equilibrium abatement technology is a greener choice than the de-centralised 
equilibrium without reciprocal solidarity (i.e. z=0). Moreover, output increases with the 
intensity of climate solidarity ( 𝜕𝑞𝑖∗/𝜕𝑧 > 0) . Intuitively, when the optimal abatement 
technology increases with the intensity of climate solidarity the firm can benefit from the 
reduction on its own emissions and produce more. With respect to the wages we get 𝜕𝑤𝑖∗/𝜕𝑧 < 0, implying that wages are decreasing with the intensity of climate solidarity. 
 
Result 1: In the Basic Model, the wages are decreasing, outputs and employment are 
increasing, and abatement technology is more environmental friendly with the intensity of 
climate solidarity. 
Finally, we can calculate profits, emissions, trade union utility, and social welfare. 
The profits are 𝜋𝑖∗ = 𝛾[2𝑎+𝑒(𝑧−2)]2[2025𝛾−4𝑒2(7+𝑧)2][405𝛾+2𝑒2(𝑧−2)(7+𝑧)]2    (10) 
The level of the emission from each firm is 𝑦𝑖∗ = 45𝛾[2𝑎+𝑒(𝑧−2)][405𝛾−4𝑎𝑒(7+𝑧)][405𝛾+2𝑒2(𝑧−2)(7+𝑧)]2     (11) 
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Like in A&GM there is a critical value which determines if the emissions are 
increasing or decreasing in the size of the market. Specifically the critical value is 𝑎𝑐𝑣 =− 14 𝑒(𝑧 − 2) + 405𝛾8𝑒(7+𝑧) which is positive for 0 < z < 1 where 𝜕𝑦𝑖∗𝜕𝑎 > 0 if 0 < a < acv and 𝜕𝑦𝑖∗𝜕𝑎 < 0 if acv < a.  
 
Additionally, the damage function is 𝐷𝐹𝑖∗ = 𝑒𝑦𝑖∗ and the Utility is 𝑈𝑖∗ = 135𝛾[2𝑎+𝑒(𝑧−2)][𝑎(45𝛾+2𝑒2𝑧(7+𝑧)−45𝑒𝛾(1+4𝑧)][405𝛾+2𝑒2(𝑧−2)(7+𝑧)]2   (12) 
where for 0 < 𝑎 < acv the utility is reducing in the market size and for 𝑎 > acv it is increasing 
in a with 𝑎𝑐𝑣 = −2𝑒3(𝑧−2)𝑧(7+𝑧)+45𝑒𝛾(4+7𝑧)180𝛾+8𝑒2𝑧(7+𝑧) . Finally, the SW10 is  𝑆𝑊∗ = 2𝛾[2𝑎 + 𝑒(𝑧 − 2)](𝑎[14175𝛾 + 2𝑒2𝑧(7 + 𝑧)(41𝑧 − 28)] − 𝑒(7 + 𝑧)[2025𝛾 + 4𝑒2(𝑧 − 2)(7 + 𝑧)])[405𝛾 + 2𝑒2(𝑧 − 2)(7 + 𝑧)]2  
                 (13) 
Non-negativity of the above results requires that a > (1/5)(e(7+z)). 
 
2.4 The alternative model  
 
We change the timing of the model in order to explore the case where the trade unions 
decide the wages prior to the firms’ decisions on employment and abatement technology: in 
the first stage trade unions decide the wages; in the second stage firms decide the abatement 
technology; in the third stage the firms decide the output. The third stage is no different 
between the two models, hence it is omitted here. 
 
2.5 Stage two: firms decide the abatement technology 
 
Provided the optimal choice of output and employment in the third stage, i.e., ?̂?𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 = (𝑎 − 2𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗)/3, the profit maximization problem of firm 𝑖 in the second stage 
is 
                   max𝑘𝑖 {?̂?𝑖 = (𝑎 − 2𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗)2/9 − 𝛾(1 − 𝑘𝑖)2}   
Clearly, in the above problem the optimal choices of abatement are 1 ji kk . Hence, when 
the trade unions decide the wages prior to the firms’ decisions on the abatement technology, 
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the firms adopt the more polluting technology. Simply, the trade unions do not have the 
power to influence the firms’ choice of technology when the decision on the wages is a long-
run commitment, stronger than the commitment on the abatement technology. From a 
regulatory perspective, environmental regulations must be stricter in industries characterized 
by long-term wage contracts and short-lived investments in abatement technology. In other 
words, the timing of the negotiations could be very important on the efficiency of chosen 
environmental policies. 
 
Result 2: When the trade unions decide the wages prior to firms’ decisions on 
abatement technology, the firms adopt the most polluting technology.  
 
Finally, given the optimal choice of abatement of the firms in the second stage, profits 
be ?̂?𝑖 = (𝑎 − 2𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗)2/9 and the emissions equal ?̅?𝑖 = (𝑎 − 2𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗)/3 so the damage 
function is given by DFi = e(𝑎 − 2𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗)/3. 
 
2.6 Stage one: Trade unions set the level of the wages 
 
Substituting the results of stages three and two in the utility function of trade union 𝑖, 
the utility maximization problem of the union becomes max𝑤𝑖 {𝑈𝑖 = 13 (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑒)(𝑎 − 2𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗) − 𝑒(𝑎 − 2𝑤𝑗 + 𝑤𝑖)𝑧}  
Taking the first order conditions yield the reaction function 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑓 = (𝑎 + 2𝑒 + 𝑤𝑗 − 𝑒𝑧)/4. 
Solving simultaneously the two reaction functions yields the optimal wages  𝑤𝑖∗ = [𝑎 − 𝑒(𝑧 − 2)]/3    (14) 
 
Hence, output and emissions are  𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑦𝑖∗ = [2𝑎 + 𝑒(𝑧 − 2)]/9   (15) 
So, the damage function is 𝐷𝐹𝑖 = 𝑒[2𝑎 + 𝑒(𝑧 − 2)]/9. The price is 𝑝𝑖∗ = [5𝑎 + 2𝑒(𝑧 − 2)]/9 and the profits are ?̅?𝑖∗ = ?̅?𝑖∗2 = [2𝑎 + 𝑒(𝑧 − 2)]/81   (16) 
Finally, the trade unions utility after the substitutions equals 𝑈𝑖∗ = [2𝑎 + 𝑒(𝑧 − 2)][𝑎 − 𝑒(1 + 4𝑧)]/27   (17) 
Similarly, with the basic model the Social Welfare is given by 
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In this section we compare the results of the two models. The superscripts BM and AM 
are used to indicate the results of the basic and the alternative model, respectively. With 
respect to differences in the choice of abatement technology, output and employment, wages, 
and prices we state the following 
 
Result 3: Let 𝑧 ∈ (0,1), 𝑎 > 𝑒(7 + 𝑧)/5 and 𝛾 > 4𝑒2(7 + 𝑧)2/2025. Then firms in 
the BM choose greener technology, produce more output, pay lower wages, and charge less 
compared to firms in the AM, i.e., 
(a) 𝑘𝐵𝑀  − 𝑘𝐴𝑀  < 0 
(b) 𝑞𝐵𝑀  − 𝑞𝐴𝑀 > 0 
(c) 𝑤𝐵𝑀  − 𝑤𝐴𝑀  < 0 
(d) 𝑝𝐵𝑀  − 𝑝𝐴𝑀  < 0 
 
Intuitively, when a firm’s abatement choice precedes the decision over wages and 
employment, environmental-friendly trade unions can give a leeway to the firms by accepting 
lower wages provided that the firms will abate more. Lower wages will lead to higher 
employment, hence higher output and lower prices in the market. When a firm’s abatement 
choice follows the decision over wages this trade-off (i.e., lower wages in return for more 
abatement) is not available due to a commitment issue: given that wages have been 
determined in a previous stage, firms have no incentive to adopt costly abatement 
technologies. Since the trade unions know that, they will set a higher wage (leading to lower 
output and employment) compared to the case where there is no such a commitment issue. 
Provided that both abatement and production are stronger in the BM than in the AM 
one cannot be sure about the difference in emissions between the two models: the former 
reduces emissions while the latter increases them. It is shown that the abatement effect 
overcomes the output effect on emissions if the market is sufficiently large. Therefore, with 




Result 4: Let 𝑧 ∈ (0,1), 𝑎 > 𝑒(7 + 𝑧)/5 and 𝛾 > 4𝑒2(7 + 𝑧)2/2025. Then firms in 
the BM pollute less compared to firms in the AM provided that the size of the market is 
sufficiently large, i.e., 
 𝑦𝐵𝑀  − 𝑦𝐴𝑀 < 0  if 𝑎 > 𝑒(𝑧−2)(405𝛾+𝑒2(𝑧−2)(7+𝑧))405𝛾 . 
 
Finally, with respect to differences in firms’ profits, unions’ utilities, and social 
welfare we state the following 
 
Result 5: Let 𝑧 ∈ (0,1), 𝑎 > 𝑒(7 + 𝑧)/5  and 𝛾 > 4𝑒2(7 + 𝑧)2/2025 . Then, 
compared to the AM, in the BM unions enjoy higher utility, firms earn higher profits, and the 
society achieves higher welfare, i.e., 
 
(a) 𝑈𝐵𝑀  − 𝑈𝐴𝑀 > 0 
(b) 𝜋𝐵𝑀  − 𝜋𝐴𝑀 > 0 
(c) 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑀  − 𝑆𝑊𝐴𝑀 > 0 
 
Table 1 below summarizes the findings described in Results 3-5.  
 













































The paper studies how trade unions’ climate solidarity or solidarity on environmental 
issues can eventually influence firms’ choices of anti-pollution technology. Trade unions 
suffer from environmental degradations incurred by members of both trade unions but can 
influence their firm’s technological choice, through the decision for the level of the wages. 
Specifically, we are considering a Cournot duopoly consisting of two geographically 
separated firms where each firm is paired with a local environmental-friendly trade union.  
The trade unions are characterized by climate solidarity, i.e., they care about the emissions at 
both locations. Firms at both locations have access to a wide range of abatement 
technologies. We adopt a Monopoly Union model where the trade unions decide the wages 
and the firms decide the employment level. We compare two models that differ in the timing 
of decision on wages and technological choices. 
We showed that, under the basic model, where technological choices are made prior 
to trade unions decision on wages, firms will adopt greener technology under the culture with 
greater reciprocal climate solidarity between trade unions. This is incentivised by the 
subsequent lower wages offered by trade unions that could further enable higher employment 
and production output. Under this equilibrium, the abatement technology chosen by the firms 
is greener than the one chosen under the de-centralised equilibrium where trade unions only 
consider the local pollutions. This implies that well-established reciprocal climate solidarities 
between trade unions will contribute to additional enhancement for the adoption of better 
abatement technology that can also lead to higher social welfare (higher employment and 
production).  
From policy perspective, the inter-governmental coordination on climate change 
issues have become increasingly difficult as it is often argued to limit the competitiveness of 
domestic firms and sometimes discourage local employment, whereas the social norms of 
being environmental considerate have been widely accepted across societies. Hence 
establishing the reciprocal climate solidarities across trade unions would be a good step of 
progression and could help internalise the environmental issues within the industry 
competitions.  
On the other hand, it is important to note that the effectiveness of the reciprocal 
climate solidarity depends on the mechanism design. We showed that under the alternative 
model, where trade unions set the wages first, the firms will adopt the dirtiest technology 
available and the total social welfare is lower. In this case the trade unions cannot influence 
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the firms’ decision in order to choose greener technology so that even the local environmental 
concerns are undermined. In practical sense, embedding climate solidarity extends the 
objectives of trade unions in the wage process. For sectors with long-term rigid wage contract 
or weak power of trade union, the decision of adopting abatement technology will simply 
matter as cost-advantage on the supply side of the economy. The environmental regulations 
must be required fully in place and strict from regulatory institutions. In contrast, when 
regulators are facing coordination challenges across the boarders or directly with local firms, 
they can enhance the establishment of the reciprocal climate solidarity between trade unions 
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